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Fiscal Receipts

Info Systems Security Program (ISSP)

NavyProcurementReconciledBLI3415
What it is
Info Systems Security Program (ISSP) (3415) is a Navy procurement line funded in the Other Procurement, Navy account.
What changed
+$36.1M FY25→26 P-1 TOA · PB2026
Who gets it
No single contractor is published as this line's leader. 2 linked award records are listed below. This line's high-confidence links do not clear the floor for a published concentration index — at least 3 awards across 2 contractor families holding positive obligations, with positive net linked dollars. Why the crosswalk is partial.

Budget figures

FY24 Actuals
$153.6MP-1 TOA · PB2026
FY25 Enacted
$155.2MP-1 TOA · PB2026
FY26 Request
$191.2MP-1 TOA · PB2026
FY25→26 Change
+$36.1MP-1 TOA · PB2026
Data coverage

FY2026 award data is a partial year — USAspending reports awards on a rolling basis, and this corpus runs through 2026-09-04. why partial FY2026 data? →

Budget trajectory

The program's 3 summary figures for FY24 to FY26, plotted in fiscal-year order: this line ends higher than it starts. The points are the summary cards above, not a separate derivation; the table beside the chart carries each figure with its own citation.
The program's 3 summary figures for FY24 to FY26, plotted in fiscal-year order: this line ends higher than it starts. The points are the summary cards above, not a separate derivation; the table beside the chart carries each figure with its own citation.FY24: $153.6MFY25: $155.2MFY26: $191.2MFY24FY25FY26
Budget trajectory: one row per fiscal year, carrying the summary figure the sparkline plots. Every figure opens its own citation.
Fiscal yearAmount
FY24$153.6M
FY25$155.2M
FY26$191.2M

All series figures: P-1 TOA · PB2026

Decade view

P-1/R-1 workbook TOA basis, shown compact in $B/$M (the workbook records USD thousands); each figure cites its own President's Budget edition

5 fiscal years of this program as published (FY2022–FY2026): a line through the actuals (filled dots), with the enacted (hollow circles) and request (diamonds) markers each edition reported. Read it for direction, not for precision — this program's actuals line rises across the span. The grid below is the same data as text, one cited figure per cell.
5 fiscal years of this program as published (FY2022–FY2026): a line through the actuals (filled dots), with the enacted (hollow circles) and request (diamonds) markers each edition reported. Read it for direction, not for precision — this program's actuals line rises across the span. The grid below is the same data as text, one cited figure per cell.FY2022 actuals — PB2024 editionFY2023 actuals — PB2025 editionFY2024 actuals — PB2026 editionFY2023 enacted — PB2024 editionFY2024 enacted — PB2025 editionFY2025 enacted — PB2026 editionFY2024 request — PB2024 editionFY2025 request — PB2025 editionFY2026 request — PB2026 editionFY22FY23FY24FY25FY26

The vertical scale does not start at zero: the baseline sits just below this program’s smallest year, so a low point on this line is not a small amount. Read the shape for direction and the grid below for the figures.

● actuals (line)  ·  ○ enacted  ·  ◇ request — gaps are editions the program is absent from, never interpolated.

Decade series values by fiscal year and President's Budget edition: one row per series (actuals, enacted, request), one column per fiscal year. Every figure opens its own citation.
SeriesFY22FY23FY24FY25FY26
Actuals$145.3M$156.0M$153.6M
Enacted–$156.0M$154.9M$155.2M
Request––$154.9M$162.0M$191.2M

blank = series not published for this year; – = absent from that edition.

Asked vs spent: the PB2024 book requested $154.9M for FY2024; the PB2026 book reported $153.6M as actual total obligation authority — $1.28M below the request. 153.6 − 154.9 = -1.3 USD millions — the compact figures above are rounded for reading.

Program lineage

No predecessor/successor lineage was recorded for this program element — no FY-to-FY transfer into or out of this line was stated in the ingested J-books, and none was inferred from the program structure.

Description

Description — Info Systems Security Program (ISSP)

The Information Systems Security Program (ISSP) ensures the protection of Navy and joint cyberspace systems from exploitation and attack. Systems include wired and wireless telecommunications systems, cybersecurity systems, and the content processed, stored, or transmitted therein. ISSP includes protection of the Navy's National Security Systems (NSS). The rapid change in the underlying commercial and government cyber infrastructures makes cybersecurity an increasingly complex and dynamic problem. ISSP provides the Navy's warfighter the essential information trust characteristics of availability, confidentiality, integrity, authentication, and non-repudiation. Cybersecurity capabilities must evolve quickly to meet the rapidly evolving threats and vulnerabilities. Programs within the ISSP budget include: Public Key Infrastructure (PKI): PKI implements a secure infrastructure for the generation, management, and delivery of digital certificates for secure electronic transactions, hardware certificate-based two-way authentication to networks, applications, web servers, and secure email. PKI equipment includes: Navy Certificate Validation Infrastructure (NCVI) Secret Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNet) & Non-Classified Internet Protocol Router Network (NIPRNet) hardware/software, and hardware token product end items. Navy Cyber Situational Awareness (NCSA): NCSA is a command and control infrastructure that provides Navy commanders with timely, trusted, and comprehensive Situational Awareness (SA) of the cyberspace domain to include tailored, near real-time visualization of network health, vulnerabilities, and operational readiness through the correlation of data from multiple sources. NCSA enables early threat detection and timely decision making. The NCSA software suite includes the Navy Commander's Cyber Dashboard (NCCD), a single view into the platform's cyber readiness, providing better visibility into Information Warfare readiness trends and drivers, as well as current cyber risk to mission; this view is provided by the Readiness Analytics and Visualization Environment (RAVEN) capability. RAVEN is a visualization capability that ingests a variety of readiness and cybersecurity inputs to create visual dashboards. NCSA implements hybrid cloud based modernized Navy Big Data Platform (BDP) instances, including pre-production development and operational instances, that enable data sharing between Navy Defensive Cyberspace Operations (DCO) data and analytics fabric and joint DCO and cyber situational awareness systems as described in the Joint Cyber Warfighting Architecture (JCWA). NCSA ashore systems will enable Navy commanders to monitor, assess, plan, and direct Navy networks to provide a high-level of confidence that operational missions can be executed as planned in adverse cyber conditions. Cyber SA will be provided via web-accessible services generated from a primary core suite fielded at Navy Cyber Defense Operations Command (NCDOC). Visualizations and analytics will be customized based on end user needs, shareable and tailorable between different end users. End users include Fleet Cyber Command/Commander Tenth Fleet (FCC/C10F), Fleet Maritime Operations Centers (MOCs), NCDOC, and Navy Network Warfare Command (NNWC). NCSA procures equipment to collect, curate, analyze, and visualize maritime operations critical for providing Navy commanders with timely, trusted, and comprehensive SA of the cyberspace domain; Data as a Service (DaaS) which provides the ability to ingest disparate data from numerous data sources; analytics suite of software and logic to integrate and translate the data ingested by the DaaS component; visualization/user interface to display cyber SA data that are relevant to the unique needs of the Cyber Commander and for display via common visual services; as well as equipment for platforms conducting Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) and other mission requirements (details held at a higher classification). The data that is collected and analyzed via SHARKCAGE will be presented and visualized via the NCSA capability. Computer Network Defense (CND): The CND afloat capability will remain until all systems have transitioned to Consolidated Afloat Networks and Enterprise Services (CANES). CND afloat Operating System Environment (OSE) includes host-based protection tools, system vulnerability tools, cyber remediation tools, supporting hardware and software for Department of Defense (DoD) mandated tools, enhanced data correlation tools, switches, ancillary devices and other related security tools. CND ashore provides capabilities to secure the Cyber Domain. CND is a set of processes and protective measures that use computer networks to detect, monitor, protect, analyze, and defend against network infiltrations resulting in service/network denial, degradation and disruptions. CND enables a government or military institute/organization to defend against network attacks perpetrated by malicious or adversarial computer systems or networks. The Fixed Submarine Broadcast System (FSBS) includes the Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications Navy (NC3-N) requirements (details held at a higher classification). Navy Cryptography (Crypto): Navy Crypto modernizes legacy cryptographic equipment which includes families of Communications Security (COMSEC) and Transmission Security (TRANSEC) devices that are divided into crypto voice, crypto data, crypto products and associated ancillary devices. These devices provide modern cryptographic solutions to replace obsolete, legacy devices within the crypto categories in order to meet mandated National Security Agency (NSA) cease key dates for modernized encryption. Advanced Cryptographic Capabilities (ACC), will provide NSA mandated cryptographic security software modernization of various communications security devices by cease key dates (details held at a higher classification). Cryptographic Modernization (CM) provides NSA mandated cryptographic modernization of various communications security devices (details held at a higher classification). Key Management (KM): KM is a combination of Tier 1 Key Management Infrastructure (KMI), Tier 2 security equipment, and Tier 3 equipment and software for key distribution and loading into End Cryptographic Units (ECUs). KMI is a single, automated, network-accessible, electronic based infrastructure that focuses on delivery of electronic key material. It provides Net Centric operations that are reliable, timely, and secure for COMSEC material management. KMI also provides the means for secure ordering, generation, production, distribution, management, and auditing of secure key of cryptographic products. SHARKCAGE: SHARKCAGE is the U.S. Navy's Defensive Cyberspace Operations (DCO) analysis enclave and means to achieve cyberspace detection-in-depth for maritime forces afloat and ashore. SHARKCAGE is the mechanism by which units, groups, and fleets will gain an Attack Sensing and Warning (AS&W) capability and how Commander, Task Force 1020/Navy Cyber Defense Operations Command (NCDOC) will achieve unity of effort and economy of force across the Navy's DCO forces. SHARKCAGE is a Navy-specific platform to complement where existing and future theater, joint, and national capabilities are insufficient for detection of adversary activities onboard maritime warfighting platforms that are located at the tactical-edge and distributed across the globe. The data that is collected and analyzed via SHARKCAGE will be presented and visualized via the NCSA capability. [P5 / CND - Train-the-Trainer]: Funding provided to transition initial training (train the trainer) to an approved solution at the schoolhouses. [P3A - 4 / Key Load Device]: Formerly known as Simple Key Loader (SKL), the nomenclature changed to Key Load Devices to account for all devices including Tactical Key Loader (TKL), Simple Key Loader (SKL) and the Next Generation Load Device (NGLD) which will replace legacy systems. [P3A - 5 / Key Load Device]: Formerly known as SKL, the nomenclature changed to Key Load Devices to account for all devices including TKL, SKL, NGLD which will replace legacy systems.

Justification

Justification — Info Systems Security Program (ISSP)

FY26 funding supports the following efforts: P3a / Computer Network Defense (CND) - (26) Ashore Systems (DA070): Various equipment to secure Navy Ashore networks, i.e., hardware and software such as host-based protection tools, Department of Defense (DoD) mandated cyber security tools, cyber security capabilities, servers, laptops, ancillary devices and CND Deployer Toolkits (CDTs). P3a / Navy Cryptography (Crypto) - Afloat (DA071): (140) In-Line Network Encryptors (INE) (Organic), (6) Advanced Cryptographic Capabilities (Organic), (105) Cryptographic Modernization (CM) (Organic); FY26 increase ($16.312M) supports Cryptographic Modernization procurements. P3a / Navy Cryptography (Crypto) - Ashore (DA071): (11) ACC (Organic), (100) Cryptographic Modernization (CM); FY26 increase ($18.917M) supports Cryptographic Modernization procurements. P3a / Key Management (KM) - Afloat (DA005): (142) Key Load Device, (43) KMI Tech Refresh installations to support the five-year refresh cycle. P3a / Key Management (KM) - Ashore (DA005): (46) Key Management Infrastructure (KMI) Tech Refresh, (214) Key Load Device (SKL) installations to support the National Security Agency (NSA) mandated five-year refresh cycle. P3a / SHARKCAGE - Afloat (DA070): (10) SHARKCAGE Afloat Suites; FY26 increase ($1.252M) is driven by the additional SHARKCAGE Afloat Suite 2.0 procurements and installations which aligns to the current fielding requirements. P3a / SHARKCAGE - Ashore (DA070): (3) SHARKCAGE Analytic Suite 2.0. P5 / Public Key Infrastructure (PKI): (10) PKI systems (DA018). P5 / Navy Cyber Situational Awareness (NCSA) Hardware, Installations, and Support: (1) NCSA Suite (DA070). Installation and support costs fluctuate based on installation site. P5 / Computer Network Defense (CND) Afloat (DA070): (12) CND Afloat systems.

Budget line items(workbook-cited)

P-1/R-1 workbook Total Obligation Authority basis (USD thousands) · PB2026.

Exhibit P-1

AccountOrgTypeAmount
Other Procurement, NavyNFY24 Actuals$153.6M
Other Procurement, NavyNFY25 Enacted$155.2M
Other Procurement, NavyNFY26 Disc. Request$191.2M
Other Procurement, NavyNFY26 Total$191.2M

Budget Details(R-2/P-40 facts)

J-book detail basis (R-2/P-40, USD millions) · PB2026 — a different accounting basis from the P-1/R-1 workbook TOA above; where the two disagree, the reconciliation strip under Budget figures shows both.

Wider than this screen — swipe the table sideways for the remaining fiscal-year columns.

ProjectAll Prior YearsFY24 ActualsFY25 TotalFY26 BaseFY26 Request
Program Element$2.53B$153.6M$155.2M$191.2M$191.2M

Follow the dollar

No follow-the-dollar view — this program's awards haven't been crosswalked at high confidence (flows cover 312 of 1,938 programs). why coverage is partial? →

Related awards

Award linkage is shown for 32 of 200 profiled companies — high- and medium-confidence USAspending matches, each row labeled; medium is the weaker evidence. why partial award coverage? →

Rows marked medium rest on evidence weaker than a program-level match, and of more than one kind. An account-based row, where the award drew from the same appropriation account as this program, is an association, not evidence that this program paid for the contract. Where the evidence is instead an FPDS acquisition-program tag or a subaward description, the program is established but which of its budget lines paid is not. An announcement link a recorded review did not leave standing is medium too. Only high rows rest on the contract naming this program with a recorded review upholding it and no recorded rejection or refutation applying.

RecipientPIIDConfidence
GENERAL DYNAMICS INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY, INC.N6523618F3044medium
SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH CORPORATIONN6523618F3113medium

Contractor concentration

No concentration index is published for this line. This line's high-confidence links do not clear the floor for a published concentration index — at least 3 awards across 2 contractor families holding positive obligations, with positive net linked dollars. An index below that floor is a fact about the sample, not about the market. Whatever further links this line carries are medium-confidence, and what each medium evidence path does and does not establish is set out in the methodology. Both bases are in the downloadable warehouse.

Lobbying mentions

No Senate LDA lobbying filing in the tracked data mentions this program element by code or alias.

Oversight

Department-level designation (not specific to this program)

GAO lists 5 high-risk areas for DOD as a whole. That designation covers the department, not Info Systems Security Program (ISSP). No program-specific GAO finding for this line is in the ingested data. See the DOD oversight record.

Program dossier

No research dossier for this program — dossiers cover 50 of 1,938 programs, the largest fully J-book-detailed lines by FY2026 requested dollars. why no dossier here? →

Primary sources

Open any budget figure for its exact receipt. Verified line items lead with the highlighted government PDF; original spreadsheets download with their budget edition and exhibit in the filename.

Budget totals · TOA sources

Detailed budget justification

The related TOA spreadsheets above use a different accounting basis from R-2/P-40 detail. Their amounts are not assumed to match these detailed sources.