Printed from https://fiscalreceipts.com/program/0603618D8Z/ — data as of August 12, 2026. Every figure is citation-backed; see the page online for per-number provenance.
Joint Electronic Advanced Technology
Budget Figures
FY2026 award data is a partial year — USASpending awards are reported on a rolling basis and the fiscal year does not close until September 30. why partial FY2026 data? →
| Fiscal year | Amount |
|---|---|
| FY24 | $16.6M |
| FY25 | $17.2M |
| FY26 | $20.6M |
All series figures: R-1 TOA · PB2026
The vertical scale does not start at zero: the baseline sits just below this program’s smallest year, so a low point on this line is not a small amount. Read the shape for direction and the grid below for the figures.
● actuals (line) · ○ enacted · ◇ request — gaps are editions the program is absent from, never interpolated.
| Series | FY15 | FY16 | FY17 | FY18 | FY19 | FY20 | FY21 | FY22 | FY23 | FY24 | FY25 | FY26 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Actuals | $10.8M | $28.7M | $21.4M | $14.0M | $12.7M | $11.8M | $14.8M | $17.7M | $23.3M | $16.6M | ||
| Enacted | $30.9M | $22.0M | $14.4M | $12.9M | $12.1M | $15.2M | $18.2M | $24.2M | $19.8M | $17.2M | ||
| Request | $22.0M | $14.4M | $12.9M | $12.1M | $15.2M | $18.2M | $19.2M | $19.8M | $20.2M | $20.6M |
blank = series not published for this year; – = absent from that edition.
Asked vs spent: the PB2023 book requested $19.2M for FY2023; the PB2025 book reported $23.3M as actual total obligation authority — $4.07M above the request. 23.3 − 19.2 = 4.1 USD millions — the compact figures above are rounded for reading.
Program Lineage
No predecessor/successor lineage was recorded for this program element — no FY-to-FY transfer into or out of this line was stated in the ingested J-books, and none was inferred from the program structure.
Description
Mission — Joint Electronic Advanced Technology
The Electromagnetic Operating Environment (EMOE) spans the terrestrial and space domains. It is the largest and most complex warfighting environment because it is universally pervasive, largely unseen, and can only be perceived through the use of advanced electronic technologies. Understanding and addressing warfighting challenges in the EMOE is essential to all military operations because it is through the use of Electromagnetic Spectrum (EMS) technologies that we perceive operational realities - the state and disposition of all military and nonmilitary forces and groups within operational environments - and coordinate all actions of our military forces. And it is through Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations (EMSO) that adversarial use of the EMOE can be impacted and potentially denied. EMS-enabled cyber capabilities have linked the cyber and EMOE domains in such a way that the two domains often enable each other. Independently, and sometimes in concert with each other, they will be used to deliver or enable non-kinetic effects. It is important that the two domains be considered in terms of their many potential synergies and not in isolation of one another. Cyberspace and the EMOE can and will overlap in operationally significant ways. Adversary radars are evolving from fixed analog systems to programmable digital variants with agile waveforms and unknown behaviors making preprogrammed electronic countermeasure less effective. Cognitive, adaptive, and passive technologies figure prominently. Foreign developments include new generations of challenging threats ranging from small, unmanned air systems and easily transportable Man-Portable Air Defense Systems (MANPADS) to dedicated anti-access area denial (A2/AD) military systems including integrated air defense systems and increasingly capable cruise and ballistic missiles that have incorporated the most advanced sensors, communication and electromagnetic warfare (EW) technologies. Non-kinetic exploits against the Command and Control (C2) networks in the cyber domain or at an EMS/cyber interface are also relevant. The Joint Electromagnetic Advanced Technology (JEAT) Program was established to address these challenges through efforts designed to substantially accelerate the development and maturing of innovative technologies to (1) address new EW and EW/Cyber warfighting challenges and (2) provide new, leap ahead EMSO warfighting capabilities to ensure U.S. warfighters will always have decisive EW and EW/Cyber overmatch capabilities. The JEAT program focuses on emerging EW and EW/Cyber-related technologies that fall outside the Services’ purviews, technologies that can be influenced with a joint (multi-Service) interest or technologies that are not being developed rapidly enough. JEAT investment influences all of these.
Mission — EW Enterprise Exploration and Innovation
Electronic Warfare (EW) Exploration and Innovation (E&I) research efforts focus on the Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations (EMSO) capabilities of electronic warfare (EW), sensing, communications; cyber capabilities, and the delivery platforms that are associated with them. The scope of the EW E&I research efforts is from a joint, multi-domain perspective over the broad range of potential non-kinetic effects. The non-kinetic effects can overlap into the Electro-Optical and Infrared (EO/IR) phenomenologies and potentially, integration with directed energy subsystems. New EW-related and EW/Cyber-related technologies are identified relative to current and projected EMSO challenges informed by the most current threat intelligence and from a joint and multi-domain perspective. Service operational perspectives are obtained through participation or facilitation of joint Communities of Interest (COIs). Potential solutions and technological synergies are explored through interaction with the research and practitioner communities. Considerable efforts are expended to avoid the potential for redundant efforts. The Joint Electronic Advanced Technology program element (JEAT) supports large-scale, operationally-relevant scenario driven multi-domain experimentation events focused on early development EMSO capabilities that are employed on small unmanned systems (UxS) across multiple operational domains. The events are structured for technology developers to experiment within an operationally relevant environment and includes wide participation by DoD operational and technical subject matter experts. Focus Areas include Distributed Electronic Attack, Deception, Digital Payload Delivery, Distributed Electronic Support and Electronic Protect with an emphasis on Swarming Algorithms, Artificial Intelligence, Machine Learning and Resilient Communications. These events started including AUKUS integration in FY-23. The purpose of the events is to observe and highlight the most current and promising capabilities available – or under development by- the commercial, academic, federal, and defense sectors of the U.S. and select international partners. The experiments provide the Defense Industrial Base (DIB), non-traditional and emerging Industry, Government and Academic based Labs opportunities to meet with Department of Defense (DoD) experts to refine their technologies on a test-fix-test basis. The experiments allow the system developers to prepare for technology transition. Typically, the Technology Readiness level (TRL) is advanced which improves commercial viability and the potential for transition. The experiment also offers a venue to demonstrate capabilities to potential transition partners.
Justification
Accomplishments & Planned Programs (1)
EW Enterprise Exploration and Innovation (EW E&I)
EW E&I research efforts identify, explore and accelerate the maturation and demonstration of new EW- and EW/Cyber-related technologies. Current EW E&I initiatives research thrusts include Passive Sensor Detection and Defeat (PSDD), Platform Self-Protection (PS-P), RF/Photonic applications, EW Technology Enablers (EW Tech), EW/Cyber Interface (EWCI) and EW Collaboration and Cognizance capabilities. Passive Sensor Detection and Defeat (PSDD): Modern integrated air defense systems (IADS) employ a variety of radar sensing technologies to detect, classify, track, target and engage adversary aircraft. Classic IADS radars are active and emit RF radiation and collect the component of their radiation that reflects off of their targets. Radar Warning Receivers (RWRs) can readily detect the radiation of active radars and pilots can take mitigating measures to avoid potential threats. Platform Self-Protection (PS-P): A wide variety of RF and Electrical Optical (EO) technologies are employed by modern militaries to detect, track, and engage attacking military systems. RF sensor systems including IADS radars, radars on ships, aircraft, ground, and naval vessels, and seekers on ballistic, cruise, air-to-air, surface-to-air missile are used to detect and provide targeting and engagement solutions to counter adversarial military systems. EO systems have been incorporated into missile seekers and are associated with high energy laser engagement systems for the same reasons. To ensure successful U.S. military actions, technologies that protect U.S. platforms and facilities against these new generations of more capable RF and EO detection/targeting/engagement sensors and seekers are essential. This thrust identifies, explores, and accelerates the maturation and demonstration of new non-kinetic approaches and technologies to counter adversarial advanced Radio Frequency (RF) and EO sensor and seeker threats. Electromagnetic Warfare Technology Enablers (EW Tech): Significant advances in materials, electronics (including photonics, plasmonics, spintronics, magnetronics, quantum technology, etc.) in the context of RF and communications sciences, optical and laser sciences, and information and computational sciences are enabling new generations of extremely powerful applications in a wide variety of fields. For example, artificial intelligence and machine learning (AI/ML) technologies have great relevance in EMSO. They can be used to enhance signal classification accuracy, determine optimal non-kinetic effects through adaptive waveform selection, enhance data fusion of very large datasets, control autonomous systems and make optimal use of dynamic spectrum access capabilities. In order to maintain capability and function of spectrum-dependent systems within the EMOE, U.S. Forces need to be able to rely on AI/ML or cognitive systems to respond as fast or faster than threat cognitive and adaptive systems can decide or maneuver spectrally within the EMOE. EW Cyber Interface (EWCI): The ability to impact system logic through utilizing EW and other RF systems provides powerful new options for EW application. EWCI research efforts identify, explore, and accelerate the maturation and demonstration of new EW/Cyber-related technologies. Significant advances in the application of digital EW have resulted in new generations of threat systems that are challenging the U.S.’s traditional dominance in these areas. As Internet of Things (IoT) technologies become more widely adopted, in particular, for networked sensing systems, the technology space shared by RF and cyber will gain importance. EW E&I efforts address emerging cyber-enabled threat systems and work towards developing new technologies and approaches that will ensure that all relevant avenues of attack, sensing or protection are considered and potentially exploited on behalf U.S. warfighters. EW E&I efforts specifically focus on areas where Service investments are lagging to accelerate the development and transition of multi-Service multi-mission EW technologies. EW E&I thrusts include Passive Sensor Detection and Defeat, Platform Self-Protection, RF/Photonic applications, EW Technology Enablers, EW/Cyber Interface (EWCI), and EW Collaboration and Cognizance capabilities.
Budget Line Items(workbook-cited)
P-1/R-1 workbook Total Obligation Authority basis (USD thousands) · PB2026.
Exhibit R-1
| Account | Org | Type | Amount |
|---|---|---|---|
| Research, Development, Test and Evaluation, Defense-Wide | OSD | FY24 Actuals | $16.6M |
| Research, Development, Test and Evaluation, Defense-Wide | OSD | FY25 Enacted | $17.2M |
| Research, Development, Test and Evaluation, Defense-Wide | OSD | FY25 Total | $17.2M |
| Research, Development, Test and Evaluation, Defense-Wide | OSD | FY26 Disc. Request | $20.6M |
| Research, Development, Test and Evaluation, Defense-Wide | OSD | FY26 Total | $20.6M |
Budget Details(R-2/P-40 facts)
J-book detail basis (R-2/P-40, USD millions) · PB2026 — a different accounting basis from the P-1/R-1 workbook TOA above; where the two disagree, the reconciliation strip under Budget Figures shows both.
Wider than this screen — swipe the table sideways for the remaining fiscal-year columns.
| Project | All Prior Years | FY24 Actuals | FY25 Total | FY26 Base | FY26 Request |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Program Element | $55.8M | $16.6M | $17.2M | $20.6M | $20.6M |
| 245: EW Enterprise Exploration and Innovation | $55.8M | $16.6M | $17.2M | $20.6M | $20.6M |
No follow-the-dollar view — this program's awards haven't been crosswalked at high confidence (flows cover 17 of 1,741 programs). why coverage is partial? →
Awards
No awards are linked to this program element at high confidence — the budget→award crosswalk only asserts links it can defend, and this line has none yet.
Lobbying Mentions
No Senate LDA lobbying filing in the tracked data mentions this program element by code or alias.
Oversight
Department-level designation (not specific to this program)
GAO lists 5 high-risk areas for DOD as a whole. That designation covers the department, not Joint Electronic Advanced Technology — no program-specific GAO finding for this line is in the ingested data. See the DOD oversight record.
No research dossier for this program — dossiers cover 50 of 1,741 programs, the largest fully J-book-detailed lines by FY2026 requested dollars. why no dossier here? →