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Fiscal Receipts

Strategic Sub & Weapons System Support

NavyRDT&EPartial Reconciliation0101221N

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What it is
Strategic Sub & Weapons System Support (0101221N) is a Navy research & development line funded in the Research, Development, Test and Evaluation, Navy account. Its J-book detail breaks the line into 4 projects.
What changed
+$471.8M FY25→26 R-1 TOA · PB2026
Who gets it
No award linkage at high confidence.

Budget Figures

FY24 Actuals
$326.3MR-1 TOA · PB2026
FY25 Total
$335.3MR-1 TOA · PB2026
FY26 Request
$807.1MR-1 TOA · PB2026
FY25→26 Change
+$471.8MR-1 TOA · PB2026

FY2026 award data is a partial year — USASpending awards are reported on a rolling basis and the fiscal year does not close until September 30. why partial FY2026 data? →

Budget Trajectory
The program's 3 summary figures for FY24 to FY26, plotted in fiscal-year order so the direction of travel is readable at a glance: this line ends higher than it starts. The points are the summary cards above, not a separate derivation; the table beside the chart carries each figure with its own citation.
The program's 3 summary figures for FY24 to FY26, plotted in fiscal-year order so the direction of travel is readable at a glance: this line ends higher than it starts. The points are the summary cards above, not a separate derivation; the table beside the chart carries each figure with its own citation.FY24: $326.3MFY25: $335.3MFY26: $807.1MFY24FY25FY26
Budget trajectory: one row per fiscal year, carrying the summary figure the sparkline plots. Every figure opens its own citation.
Fiscal yearAmount
FY24$326.3M
FY25$335.3M
FY26$807.1M

All series figures: R-1 TOA · PB2026

Decade view — P-1/R-1 workbook TOA basis, shown compact in $B/$M (the workbook records USD thousands); each figure cites its own President's Budget edition
12 fiscal years of this program as published (FY2015–FY2026): a line through the actuals (filled dots), with the enacted (hollow circles) and request (diamonds) markers each edition reported. Read it for direction, not for precision — this program's actuals line rises across the span. The grid below is the same data as text, one cited figure per cell.
12 fiscal years of this program as published (FY2015–FY2026): a line through the actuals (filled dots), with the enacted (hollow circles) and request (diamonds) markers each edition reported. Read it for direction, not for precision — this program's actuals line rises across the span. The grid below is the same data as text, one cited figure per cell.FY2015 actuals — PB2017 editionFY2016 actuals — PB2018 editionFY2017 actuals — PB2019 editionFY2018 actuals — PB2020 editionFY2019 actuals — PB2021 editionFY2020 actuals — PB2022 editionFY2021 actuals — PB2023 editionFY2022 actuals — PB2024 editionFY2023 actuals — PB2025 editionFY2024 actuals — PB2026 editionFY2016 enacted — PB2017 editionFY2017 enacted — PB2018 editionFY2018 enacted — PB2019 editionFY2019 enacted — PB2020 editionFY2020 enacted — PB2021 editionFY2021 enacted — PB2022 editionFY2022 enacted — PB2023 editionFY2023 enacted — PB2024 editionFY2024 enacted — PB2025 editionFY2025 enacted — PB2026 editionFY2017 request — PB2017 editionFY2018 request — PB2018 editionFY2019 request — PB2019 editionFY2020 request — PB2020 editionFY2021 request — PB2021 editionFY2022 request — PB2022 editionFY2023 request — PB2023 editionFY2024 request — PB2024 editionFY2025 request — PB2025 editionFY2026 request — PB2026 editionFY15FY18FY20FY22FY24FY26

The vertical scale does not start at zero: the baseline sits just below this program’s smallest year, so a low point on this line is not a small amount. Read the shape for direction and the grid below for the figures.

● actuals (line)  ·  ○ enacted  ·  ◇ request — gaps are editions the program is absent from, never interpolated.

Decade series values by fiscal year and President's Budget edition: one row per series (actuals, enacted, request), one column per fiscal year. Every figure opens its own citation.
SeriesFY15FY16FY17FY18FY19FY20FY21FY22FY23FY24FY25FY26
Actuals$93.9M$96.1M$130.4M$130.7M$145.7M$121.1M$121.2M$190.9M$304.0M$326.3M
Enacted$96.4M$136.6M$135.2M$148.4M$125.8M$125.0M$187.0M$312.5M$321.6M$335.3M
Request$136.6M$135.2M$157.7M$157.7M$173.1M$177.1M$284.5M$321.6M$403.5M$807.1M

blank = series not published for this year; – = absent from that edition.

Asked vs spent: the PB2021 book requested $173.1M for FY2021; the PB2023 book reported $121.2M as actual total obligation authority — $51.9M below the request. 121.2173.1 = -51.9 USD millions — the compact figures above are rounded for reading.

Program Lineage

No predecessor/successor lineage was recorded for this program element — no FY-to-FY transfer into or out of this line was stated in the ingested J-books, and none was inferred from the program structure.

Description

Mission Strategic Sub & Wpns Sys Supt

The Strategic Submarine & Weapon Systems Support program element directly supports the Navy's deterrence mission, specifically the Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM). The SLBM is comprised of several key sub-systems, including launcher, navigation, missile, guidance, fire control, re-entry, platform integration, and instrumentation components. Nuclear Weapons Surety is also a critical element to safeguarding nuclear weapons within the Department of Defense. The SLBM accounts for approximately 70 percent of the deployable nuclear inventory, is the most survivable leg of the triad and foundational to the nation's deterrence strategy. Nuclear deterrence underwrites every U.S. military operation and capability on the globe and serves as the backstop for both our national defense and the defense of our allies. The nation's nuclear triad serves as the bedrock of our ability to deter aggression, assure our allies and partners, achieve U.S. objectives should deterrence fail, and hedge against an uncertain future.

Mission Technical Applications Programs

Trident II D5 Modernization (D5LE2): The Trident II D5LE2 program is essential to modernize the submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) leg of the U.S. nuclear triad. The current D5LE system, deployed on OHIO-class submarines, will be insufficient for the COLUMBIA class throughout its service life (through 2084) due to aging components and obsolescence. D5LE2 will address these issues by providing a modernized SLBM system with the range and accuracy of the current system, while also incorporating adaptability and resilience to meet evolving threats from peer adversaries. This ensures a credible and survivable sea-based deterrent for decades to come. The D5LE2 program, a subprogram of the original Trident II D5/D5LE, will focus on key system upgrades including architecture, avionics, guidance, flight structures, and post-boost controls. While leveraging existing viable components like rocket motors, the program will prioritize developing critical technologies such as radiation-hardened electronics, advanced guidance systems, and post-boost controls using high refractory metals. A modular architecture will allow integration of current and future technologies, maximizing the long-term effectiveness and adaptability of the Trident II system. Continued funding for D5LE2 into FY 2026 is crucial to avoid capability gaps and support the COLUMBIA-class deployment timeline. Specifically, FY 2026 funding will enable the maturation of critical technologies necessary for long-lead material procurement. This investment represents the single greatest risk mitigation factor for the program, ensuring key technologies are ready for integration. This phased approach to technology development, accounting for component complexity, is vital for the timely and effective modernization of this critical element of national security. System Evaluation RDT&E will decrease as system level requirements and architecture efforts complete in FY 2026 with stable technical baselines for subsystem development and procurement to execute going forward. FY 2026 Threat & Risk-Informed Advanced Development (TRIAD) R&D: The Threat & Risk-Informed Advanced Development program is established in FY 2026 to leverage technological advancements, coordinate advanced research across stakeholders, and collaborate with government and industry partners to identify and outpace future threats to the nation's Sea-based Strategic Deterrent. Specific RDT&EN investments will aim to (1) preserve Trident II D5LE missile strategic weapon system (SWS) survivability against current and future threats; (2) respond to warfighter demands at the speed of relevance by enhancing effectiveness and capabilities in accordance with USSTRATCOM and Navy priorities; and (3) ensure the sustainment of the SWS demonstrated performance through 2084. Between 1955 and 1990, consistent investment in Research and Development (R&D) fueled the success of the Strategic Weapons System (SWS) through a series of development and production programs. However, unlike previous transitions between SLBM systems (A1, A2, A3, C3, C4), development of a Trident D5 follow-on was not immediately initiated. This resulted in a significant decline in R&D funding for submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) systems in the early 1990s. Additionally as the U.S. shifted towards a nuclear force sustainment paradigm, investments in advanced delivery system capabilities to counter emerging threats were curtailed. Consequently, the pipeline for developing cutting-edge technologies has weakened considerably. This gap in R&D investment has led current programs, often risk-averse and schedule-driven, to rely on maturing existing technology during acquisition, in an effort to manage risk. This approach can lead to deploying technologies that may not be sufficiently adaptable to future threats. Furthermore, this long-term reduction in R&D has resulted in a diminished workforce with the specialized skills necessary to address next-generation technical challenges. A robust technology maturation pipeline and a suitably skilled workforce are essential for mitigating high-risk factors across the entire nuclear enterprise, and their absence remains a significant concern. The work will be accomplished in categorical efforts managed and prioritized across Position and Accuracy, Advanced Materials, Expanded Launch Area, Increased Targeting Flexibility, Emerging Threats, and Supporting Infrastructure. Key stakeholders include but are not limited to the following: Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center, Missile Defense Agency, Naval Research Establishment, and others. The TRIAD project will identify and mature technologies from Technology Readiness Levels (TRL) 6 - 9 via relevant high fidelity laboratory environment, simulated operational environment, and operational test and evaluation under mission conditions.

Mission W-93 / Mk 7

The W93/Mk7 warhead project (3097) will provide the US Navy with a third SLBM warhead variant, enhancing flexibility in managing the nuclear stockpile. Designed to meet STRATCOM requirements and maintain a credible sea-based deterrent, the W93/Mk7 incorporates advanced technology to address emerging threats. W93/Mk7 will provide opportunities to improve the current force by delivering the President flexible options to deter or limit conflict. The W93/Mk7 is being designed to allow for modifications if needed to adapt to the changing threat environment. This project also reinforces the US commitment to supporting the UK's independent nuclear deterrent. Critical early investments are required for the development of critical skills and recapitalization of the atrophied industrial base. The U.S. has not delivered an integrated ballistic reentry system since the 1980s. The program will align to the President's priority of strengthening our Nation's manufacturing and defense industrial base while improving supply chain resiliency and reducing reliance on foreign countries. In order to manage the development, production, maintenance, and retirement of W93/Mk7, the Department of Defense (DoD) and Department of Energy (DOE) / National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) will utilize the DoD-DOE/NNSA Nuclear Weapons Lifecycle Process (Phase X). Phase X process is a joint effort which provides a common framework to conduct and manages phased activities: Phase 1 - Concept Assessment, Phase 2 - Feasibility Study and Design Options, Phase 2A - Design Definition and Cost Study, Phase 3 - Development Engineering, Phase 4 - Production Engineering, Phase 5 - First Production, Phase 6 - Full-Scale Production/Sustainment, Phase 7 - Retirement, Dismantlement, and Disposal. W93/Mk7 Program entered Phase 2A in March 2025. Progress and accomplishments achieved between Phase 1 and Phase 2A include the following: - Early efforts primarily consisted of developing programmatic planning and structure to support the future program along with further exploration and refinement of the concept studies that resulted from the Feasibility Management Team Study, which was directed in the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR). Following the results of the Feasibility Management Team Study, refinement of the concept study was accomplished through system trade studies and initial high level requirements documents were drafted to support the program entering a Phase 2 (Feasibility Study and Design Options) / 2A (Design Definition and Cost Study). - As part of the Phase 1 analysis, U.S. Navy Strategic Systems Programs and the NNSA identified ways to reduce the overall burden on the Nation's weapons complex and nuclear enterprise facilities through innovative design and logistics planning. These changes to legacy planning factors resulted in significant cost reduction to the program's sustainment and lifecycle costs. - The development and submission of the Executive Report to the Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC) outlined analysis and findings from Phase 1, which served as the baseline for further analysis of refined and matured concept designs in Phase 2. - Identified necessary investments and aligned stakeholders on planned investments within the nuclear enterprise. - Developed draft military characteristics, stockpile to target sequence, and identified interdependencies between requirement drivers of DoD and DOE. - Developed initial nuclear enterprise assurance and supply chain protection considerations. - Drafted threat and vulnerability assessments, as well as safety, security, and use control architectures. - Phase 2A activities focus on flight tests, design work, and significant hardware component testing.

Mission Integrated Nuclear Weapons Security Sys Dev

This budget supports the development and fielding of new technologies across multiple domains - transit escort security, air, cyber, and underwater - to protect the nation's nuclear weapons against emerging threats, including uncrewed systems (UxS). Specifically, funding is allocated for research, development, and testing within these technological areas to upgrade security systems, improve the ability to deter, detect, delay, deny, and/or defeat adversaries, and ensure continuity between nuclear weapon security and operational missions. This is critical because the Integrated Nuclear Weapons Security Systems Development efforts directly support the Nuclear Weapons Surety (NWS) program and the Transit Protection Program (TPP), as outlined in DoDM S5210.41. Within the Department of the Navy, these efforts are focused on TRIDENT Fleet Ballistic Missiles (FBM) deployed aboard Ballistic Missile submarines or stored at Strategic Weapons Facilities in Kings Bay and Bangor. The Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) has assigned Strategic Systems Programs (SSP) the mission responsibility for safeguarding these FBM nuclear assets, including land-side and pier operations for storage, loading, and unloading, as well as security and protection of SSBNs during transit. Each of these environments presents unique security challenges to personnel and currently fielded NWS security systems, making these upgrades essential to SSP's responsibility to the Nuclear Deterrence Mission.

Mission Congressional Adds

Congressional adds to support: - Security monitoring at maritime chokepoints will evaluate a network of passive seismic and hydroacoustic phased arrays to determine its effectiveness in detecting, classifying, localizing, and tracking hostile submarines and unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs). This assessment should focus on the system's ability to counter covert threats posed to ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) while transiting critical maritime chokepoints or during port visits. - Next Generation Strategic Inertial Measurement Unit will research, develop and demonstrate radiation-hardened navigation technologies for reentry specific applications, strategic grade inertial instruments, software, electromechanical components and algorithms that exercise strategic skills and are applicable to the long-term viability of the nation's strategic grade guidance systems - Multimodal biometric authentication supports the investigation and development of biometric technology.

Justification

Accomplishments & Planned Programs (11)

TRIAD - Position and Accuracy

Advance technologies that enhance system positioning capabilities through diverse navigation references and multiple data stream integration. This development will improve positional accuracy and system resilience during operations, particularly in degraded or contested navigation environments.

TRIAD - Advanced Materials

Develop technologies that incorporate advanced materials into system components, enabling enhanced performance and increased survivability. This materials engineering approach will improve system capabilities while reducing manufacturing costs through innovative production methods and material applications.

TRIAD - Expanded Launch Area

Develop technologies that expand operational flexibility across diverse geographic regions, enhancing the system's deployment capabilities. This increased geographic versatility will strengthen strategic deterrence by expanding target coverage and improving mission effectiveness.

TRIAD - Increased Targeting Flexibility

Advance technologies that enhance targeting flexibility and data transmission capabilities, enabling rapid mission updates and sophisticated targeting approaches. These improvements in data architecture and targeting systems will optimize weapon employment while expanding operational capabilities and mission effectiveness.

TRIAD - Emerging Threats

Through advanced simulation environments and integrated threat modeling, we will evaluate how current and emerging threats perform against candidate defensive technologies. This methodical assessment approach enables validation of technology effectiveness prior to major investment decisions, ensuring development resources are directed toward the most promising solutions. By leveraging high-fidelity simulations early in the development cycle, we can significantly reduce program risk and maximize return on research and development investments.

TRIAD - Supporting Infrastructure

Advance testing technologies to enhance data collection capabilities and telemetry systems, allowing for more comprehensive information gathering during flight tests. Develop integrated data management systems to effectively combine and analyze multiple data sources related to the system. These improvements will enable better maintenance planning, resulting in shorter maintenance periods and extended operational service life.

RBA Development

The Reentry Body Assembly (RBA) development is a critical undertaking, encompassing the complete lifecycle of the Reentry Body (RB) and Release Assembly (RA) - from innovative design to rigorous testing. This vital work includes the intricate integration of the warhead within the RB, ensuring a highly optimized and effective system. A comprehensive testing strategy, employing both component-level and system-level evaluations, generates data that validates the RBA's performance against stringent requirements.

Arming and Fuzing Development

The Arming and Fuzing (A&F) subsystem is critical for ensuring the reliability and accuracy of firing the warhead over the intended target. To achieve an optimum design for the D5LE missile, the Navy and the Department of Energy have established an integrated program for the Arming, Fuzing, and Firing system. The development of the Arming and Fuzing subsystem is a collaborative effort executed through the National Nuclear Security Administration.

Fire Control Development

Fire Control Development is a critical element of the W93/Mk7 program, responsible for generating and delivering the precise preset message that governs the operational parameters of the Strategic Weapon System (SWS). This message is essential for ensuring accurate and reliable weapon performance, making the Fire Control system a vital component for mission success. Given the W93/Mk7's status as a novel system, Fire Control Development necessitates the creation of entirely new inputs and significant software revisions. The importance of this undertaking stems from its direct impact on mission success, weapon safety, system compatibility with the SWS, and ultimately, the enhancement of national security through a dependable and effective nuclear deterrent.

RBA to Missile Integration Development

The W93/Mk7 program includes critical Reentry Body Assembly (RBA) integration efforts with the Trident II missile system. These efforts modernize the weapon system through comprehensive missile assessments, flight test support, and software development, ensuring the new RBA design maintains and enhances strategic weapon system accuracy, reliability, and overall performance.

Strategic Weapon Integration

The W93/Mk7 integration requires dedicated efforts at the TRIDENT II D5LE Strategic Weapon System (SWS) level to ensure seamless incorporation into the existing infrastructure. These efforts encompass system-level design reviews, program acquisition activities, rigorous safety and security protocols, and comprehensive integration planning, all essential for a successful and reliable deployment.

Budget Line Items(workbook-cited)

P-1/R-1 workbook Total Obligation Authority basis (USD thousands) · PB2026.

Exhibit R-1

AccountOrgTypeAmount
Research, Development, Test and Evaluation, NavyNFY24 Actuals$326.3M
Research, Development, Test and Evaluation, NavyNFY25 Enacted$335.3M
Research, Development, Test and Evaluation, NavyNFY25 Total$335.3M
Research, Development, Test and Evaluation, NavyNFY26 Disc. Request$807.1M
Research, Development, Test and Evaluation, NavyNFY26 Total$807.1M

Budget Details(R-2/P-40 facts)

J-book detail basis (R-2/P-40, USD millions) · PB2026 — a different accounting basis from the P-1/R-1 workbook TOA above; where the two disagree, the reconciliation strip under Budget Figures shows both.

Wider than this screen — swipe the table sideways for the remaining fiscal-year columns.

ProjectAll Prior YearsFY24 ActualsFY25 TotalFY26 BaseFY26 Request
Program Element$1.25B$326.3M$335.3M$807.1M$807.1M
2228: Technical Applications Programs$953.8M$184.7M$53.2M$185.2M$185.2M
3097: W-93 / Mk 7$244.0M$123.5M$266.1M$618.8M$618.8M
3158: Integrated Nuclear Weapons Security Sys Dev$22.3M$3.57M$3.18M$3.10M$3.10M
9999: Congressional Adds$27.0M$14.5M$12.8M$0$0

No follow-the-dollar view — this program's awards haven't been crosswalked at high confidence (flows cover 17 of 1,741 programs). why coverage is partial? →

Awards

No awards are linked to this program element at high confidence — the budget→award crosswalk only asserts links it can defend, and this line has none yet.

Lobbying Mentions

No Senate LDA lobbying filing in the tracked data mentions this program element by code or alias.

Oversight

Department-level designation (not specific to this program)

GAO lists 5 high-risk areas for DOD as a whole. That designation covers the department, not Strategic Sub & Weapons System Support — no program-specific GAO finding for this line is in the ingested data. See the DOD oversight record.

No research dossier for this program — dossiers cover 50 of 1,741 programs, the largest fully J-book-detailed lines by FY2026 requested dollars. why no dossier here? →